Extended Abstract to appear in EC 2022.
Abstract: We explore the dynamic relationship of school choices at different educational levels and how it affects school segregation. Using administrative data from New York City, we find causal effects of middle schools that students attend on their high school applications and assignments. Motivated by this finding, we estimate a dynamic model of middle and high school choices. We find that middle schools’ effects operate mainly by changing how students rank high schools rather than how high schools rank their applications. Our counterfactual policy analysis shows that policymakers can exploit the dynamic relationship of school choices to design more effective policies.
Draft available on request, Recording of presentation at ESWC 2020
Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that market participants make mistakes (even) in a strategically straightforward environment but seldom with significant payoff consequences. Uncertainties arising from the use of lotteries or other sources increase payoff consequences of certain mistakes, and force participants to take care to avoid them. Consequently, uncertainties limit the extent to which certain mistakes are made, thus making it possible for one to infer some preference relations reliably. We propose a novel method of exploiting the uncertainties present in a matching environment to systematically and robustly infer student preferences over schools based on their rank-order lists data. Our method consists of three steps: (i) simulating the underlying structure of uncertainties present in the environment, (ii) extracting preference relations revealed under the simulated uncertainties, and then (iii) extending the revealed preference relations via the axiom of transitivity. Depending on the type of uncertainties present, the method rationalizes a variety of procedures, ranging from truthful-reporting assumption at one extreme (full-support uncertainty) to the stability assumption at the other extreme (when there is little uncertainty). Further, we refine our method to strengthen the robustness of the revealed preferences in the presence of participants making even some payoff-relevant mistakes, and explore ways to optimally balance the tradeoff between robustness and efficiency in preference estimation. We apply our methods to estimate student preferences through a Monte Carlo analysis capturing canonical school choice environment with single tie-breaking lotteries. Finally, we apply our methods as well as other existing methods to New York City high school assignment data to explore their implications for preference estimation and counterfactual analysis under a possible policy intervention.
Draft available on request.
Abstract: We develop a signaling model of prestige seeking in competitive college applications. A prestigious program attracts competition from applicants, which in turn makes the program more selective in admitting students. This further increases the program's prestige and draws further competition, and so on. This amplifying effect of prestige seeking results in a program with little or no quality advantage enjoying a significant prestige in equilibrium. On the student side, the pursuit of prestige forces them to "sacrifice" their idiosyncratic preferences, or fits, for programs in application, resulting in a misallocation of program fits. The analysis of major choice data from Seoul National University provides evidence for the significant role played by the prestige concerns, for misallocation of major fits, and for its adverse effect on a student's academic performance in the chosen major, when majors are assigned through competitive screening---an important feature of college admissions adopted in many countries.
Draft available on request.
Abstract: This paper studies how families use two margins to get a seat in their preferred school under school choice - 1) sorting into neighborhoods (choosing where to live) and 2) commuting to school (choosing which school to apply to). Using New York City student-level data, we present the evidence of both margins. We find a sharp discontinuity at school district boundaries: middle school applicants residing on the side of the boundary with better schools are 5pp less likely to be eligible for Free or Reduced Lunch compared to their peers on the other side. At the same time, students take advantage of choice options actively with significant heterogeneity. 24% of Black students commute across school district boundaries while 12% of White students do. We build and estimate a structural model where a household chooses where to live and then which school to apply to. Location and schools are tied through commuting cost and geography-based priority. We extend the Expectation-Maximization algorithm with Sequential Maximization step (Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003) to estimate the model. We incorporate Boundary Discontinuity Design to deal with the endogeneity of school characteristics. We find that families sort into neighborhoods based on both observable/unobserved taste over school characteristics. There is large individual heterogeneity in terms of which neighborhood gives the higher expected utility. The decomposition exercise shows that heterogeneity in location demand explains 80 percent of the gap in the mean test score of schools Black and White students are assigned to. Both extending the bus service across school districts and adopting free borough-wide choice undo the gap by 10 percent.
"What Makes NYC Specialized High Schools So Special?: Relating School Effectiveness and Student Preferences"
Draft available on request.
Abstract: New York City (NYC) specialized high schools are highly selective and popular among students and parents. Nevertheless, the reason why those schools are so popular compared to non-specialized high schools has not been studied yet. This paper aims to answer the question in the context of academic performance, by studying the relationship among three factors: preference of specialized high schools applicants, peer qualities and causal effectiveness of those schools. First, a unique feature of NYC public high school admission system enables me to link preferences on specialized high schools and non-specialized high schools and hence to jointly estimate those using students' rank-ordered lists. Next, I estimate the value-added of schools that corrects endogenous selection following Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017), and finally link them to the estimated preference in the first step. I preliminarily find the additional valuation that students and parents put on specialized high schools relative to non-specialized high schools is mostly related with higher peer quality at specialized high schools.